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UID:2193@i2m.univ-amu.fr
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20180216T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20180216T150000
DTSTAMP:20180201T130000Z
URL:https://www.i2m.univ-amu.fr/evenements/from-telecom-to-social-networks
 -competition-and-shaping-activity-in-timeline-networks/
SUMMARY: (...): From Telecom to social networks: competition and shaping ac
 tivity in timeline networks
DESCRIPTION:: In this presentation\, we adapt mathematical tools and models
  from Telecommunication Networks to Online Social networks. We will focus 
 our presentation on two main issues in OSNs\, algorithms for shaping timel
 ines and the effects of a competition over popularity in OSNs. This presen
 tation is based on two papers:- Timelines are publisher-driven caches: Ana
 lyzing and shaping timeline networksCache networks are one of the building
  blocks of information centric networks (ICNs). Most of the recent work on
  cache networks has focused on networks of request driven caches\, which a
 re populated based on users requests for content gen- erated by publishers
 . However\, user generated content still poses the most pressing challenge
 s. For such content timelines are the de facto sharing solution. In this p
 aper\, we establish a connection between timelines and publisher-driven ca
 ches. We propose simple models and metrics to analyze publisher-driven cac
 hes\, allowing for variable-sized objects. Then\, we design two efficient 
 algorithms for timeline workload shaping\, leveraging admission and price 
 control in order\, for instance\, to aid service providers to attain presc
 ribed service level agreements. - Game theory approach for modeling compet
 ition over visibility on social networksIn Online Social Networks\, such a
 s Facebook\, Linkedin\, Twitter\, Google+ and others\, many members post m
 essages to walls or to timelines of their friends. There is a permanent co
 mpetition over content visibility since timelines have finite capacity. As
  new content arrives\, older content gets pushed away from the timeline. A
  selfish source that wishes to be visible has to send from time to time ne
 w content thus pre-empting other content from the timeline. We assume that
  sending more content comes with some extra cost. We study the problem of 
 selecting the rates of content creation as a non-cooperative game between 
 several sources that share some common destination to which they send cont
 ent. We identify conditions under which the problem can be reduced to the 
 Kelly mechanism for which we compute explicitly the equilibrium. This is d
 one in a very general probabilistic framework where time between arrivals 
 of content is only required to be stationary ergodic. http://www.researchg
 ate.net/profile/Alexandre_Reiffers-Masson
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