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UID:1990@i2m.univ-amu.fr
DTSTART;TZID=Europe/Paris:20171110T140000
DTEND;TZID=Europe/Paris:20171110T150000
DTSTAMP:20171026T120000Z
URL:https://www.i2m.univ-amu.fr/evenements/strategic-transmission-of-infor
 mation/
SUMMARY: (...): Strategic transmission of information
DESCRIPTION:: What information one has to transmit when the receiver has a 
 different objective from the sender ? Originally in the Economics literatu
 re\, the problem of "Strategic Information Transmission'' arises in decent
 ralized networks when the users are considered as players\, that choose au
 tonomously a transmission scheme in order to maximize their own utility fu
 nction. The key difference with conventional communication paradigm is tha
 t the meaning of the information symbol has to be considered carefully. In
 deed\, each information might have a different impact on the utility funct
 ions of the users\, hence it has to be compressed and transmitted accordin
 gly. Instead of ensuring reliable transmission\, the goal of the encoder i
 s to manipulate the posterior beliefs of the decoder in order to influence
  its action. We provide a unified approach to this problem by generalizing
  the Rate-Distortion results in Information Theory and the Persuasion resu
 lts in Game Theory. By using the tool of ``Empirical Coordination''\, we c
 haracterize the optimal ``Strategic Transmission’’ in terms of a conca
 vification over the space of the posterior beliefs\, under a mean entropy 
 constraint.http://sites.google.com/site/maelletreust/
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DTSTART:20171029T020000
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